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 Selcuk Caner and Manouchehr Mokhtari
 Arrears and Their Implications
 for Economic Performance in the
 Russian Federation
 One of the main problems that occur in economies in transition is
 the accumulated stock of arrears or the nonpayment of short-term
 liabilities. Arrears are overdue liabilities of enterprises, govern
 ments, and individuals. Arrears consist of unpaid trade credits to
 trading partners, unpaid wages to workers, and delinquent and
 deferred taxes. Arrears are expected to occur in the early phases of
 transition from a command economy to a market-based economy
 as a result of adjustment towards a cash-based mode of exchange.
 However, while it is somewhat mitigated in other countries in
 transition, the problem of arrears continues to be one of the major
 financial problems in the Russian Federation. While some argue
 that a high level of arrears is not a major threat for economic growth,
 it will have a profound effect if the average maturity of overdue
 liabilities remains very long, as is the case in the Russian Federa
 tion.1 In particular, arrears in the form of trade credits and taxes
 restrict the cash flow to suppliers, as well as the government,
 thereby affecting production, investment, and government services.
 We particularly focus on the effects of arrears on government fi
 Selcuk Caner is affiliated with Bilkent University, Ankara, and the U.S. Trea
 sury. Manouchehr Mokhtari is affiliated with the University of Maryland, Col
 lege Park.
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 nances and decompose the components of tax arrears to the gov
 ernment. The budget deficits experienced by successive govern
 ments are the direct result of increasing arrears. Furthermore, a
 few industries dominated by a small number of large enterprises?
 particularly oil and gas, energy, heavy metals and construction?
 account for most of the arrears in the Russian economy. These
 industries account for more than three-quarters of the tax arrears.
 More than half of tax arrears are generated from the value-added
 tax (VAT). This implies that companies in fact collect the tax but
 to not remit to the tax authorities. All this points to the inadequate
 restructuring in the Russian economy since the beginning of mar
 ket-oriented reforms in 1992.
 Transition is characterized by reallocation and restructuring,
 which produce a sharp decline in output followed by a gradual
 recovery.2 The economic performance of Eastern European coun
 tries and the former Soviet Union (FSU) since 1991 has been char
 acterized by these two mechanisms. Reallocation has been achieved
 by swift price liberalization, and removal of subsidies to state en
 terprises (i.e., introduction of hard budget constraints), followed
 by a decline in the output of state firms and its substitution by the
 private sector and imports. However, the collapse of state enter
 prises has often surpassed expectations, while the growth of pri
 vate sector has remained inadequate. The decrease in economic
 activity has been primarily due to unanticipated changes in the
 way agents interact in the economy, including the increase in ille
 gal activities, barter, and the lack of financial means for output
 adjustment. Furthermore, the effects of macroeconomic policies
 that affect aggregate demand have varied from one country to an
 other, in most cases depending on the response of state firms. The
 beginning stage of transition has become important. For example,
 countries with vertically integrated enterprise systems also have
 lagged in adjusting to new market conditions. Vertical integration
 has facilitated inter-enterprise trade credits and arrears between
 trading partners. The Russian tax laws also does not include arms
 length provisions between related businesses, and further encour
 ages expansion of inter-enterprise credits.
 Restructuring has been associated with improved productivity,
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 an increase in unemployment, and privatization. Under restructur
 ing, the existing production methods need to be replaced with new
 technologies, requiring retraining as well as fewer employees. In
 the case of the Russian Federation, a decrease in employment,
 among both workers and managers, has not happened at signifi
 cant levels. Furthermore, large capital expenditures have been
 needed to upgrade and replace the existing capital stock necessary
 for restructuring. Since most firms do not have the funds to fi
 nance such expenditures, restructuring has been very difficult. First,
 retained earnings have either been inadequate, or have been used
 up by the workers and managers in non-production-related activi
 ties, such as housing and municipal services. Second, equity fi
 nance has been even more difficult due to the lack of protection of
 property rights. Third, large debt financing has been almost im
 possible due to low levels of credibility and lack of credit history.
 In addition, the banking system has not been sufficiently devel
 oped in providing credits to industry. Since state firms have been
 unlikely to restructure under the circumstances, it has been neces
 sary to privatize on a large scale. However, privatization has not
 generated the funds needed for capital expenditures by the for
 merly state-owned enterprises. Investment levels remained very
 low, even after large-scale privatization. In the Russian Federa
 tion, large enterprises have lacked the funding for capital expen
 ditures essential for restructuring. Furthermore, they have continued
 their non-production-related commitments such as financing, train
 ing, and housing maintenance for employees. As a result of insuf
 ficient finance, gross fixed investment had declined to 9 percent
 of GDP by 1997.
 Insufficient credit and own resources, coupled with tight mon
 etary policy, have forced enterprises to seek sources of funds out
 side the usual financial markets. To finance their current operations
 and restructuring needs, enterprises?in particular, large quasi-state
 enterprises?have developed alternative forms of financing such
 as veksels (simply, traded IOUs) and offsets. Arrears, in particular,
 have required special attention due to their size and rapid growth
 under the tight monetary policies pursued by the Central Bank of
 Russia (CBR) since 1995. Aggregate arrears include inter-enter
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 prise arrears, including banks, wage arrears to employees, and tax
 arrears to both the federal and regional governments.
 In the Russian Federation, the lack of proper institutions?that
 is, a well-functioning stock market, a sound banking system, and
 a contract-enforcement mechanism?has contributed significantly
 to the accumulation of arrears.3 Arrears hold implications for eco
 nomic growth, government finances, and consumption and sav
 ings. While they may be a cheap source of financing for large
 enterprises that can obtain large trade credits from their suppliers,
 arrears also have had the effect of increasing the cost of doing
 business elsewhere in the economy by contributing to illiquidity
 and business risks. In addition, nonpayment of taxes has distorted
 taxation, and has produced large budget deficits when tax collec
 tion efforts have been inadequate. The resulting budget deficits
 have further resulted in high interest rates. Furthermore, the ar
 rears have implicitly amounted to the continuation of the practice
 of "soft budget constraints" in certain favored industries.
 Creation of arrears to employees, as practiced by government
 and enterprises, has amounted to wage flexibility, while keeping
 unemployment low. Although the three types of arrears?namely,
 the inter-enterprise, wage, and tax arrears?are highly correlated,
 they have different characteristics. While they occur due to insuf
 ficient restructuring in the enterprise sector, sometimes they de
 velop together, or act as substitutes for each other at different times.
 Inter-enterprise arrears have accrued in the form of unpaid trade
 credits. Wage arrears have occurred in distressed industries, pri
 marily in public enterprises, agriculture, transportation, and con
 struction. The reasons for tax arrears, however, are not clear,
 because large cash-based enterprises such as exporters in more
 open regions, have had tax arrears just as large as poorly adjusted
 enterprises. Although one could argue that tax authorities believe
 that the liquidation value of the firms may be less than their ac
 crued tax arrears, tax authorities should not have allowed such a
 debt to accrue. Particularly, VAT is the main source of tax arrears,
 which indicates a lack of collection enforcement on the part of the
 tax authorities. In this study, we focus on the tax arrears, and pro
 vide a more detailed account of tax arrears.
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 Arrears developed with the start of tight monetary policy of the
 Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1995, and has accumulated very
 quickly. This phenomenon occurs in most transition economies.
 Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) did not consider the arrears prob
 lem in transition economies to be significantly different than in
 developed countries, based on a comparison of the ratio of trade
 credits to GDR However, the collectible portion of the outstand
 ing debt in the Russian Federation is probably very small com
 pared to other countries. Furthermore, the value of the outstanding
 debt is highly discounted in the Russian Federation.
 Another difference between the Russian Federation and the de
 velop countries has been the volume of trade credit relative to
 bank credit. The ratio of trade credit to bank credit in the Russian
 Federation is 2.5, while in the United States it is only 0.5, and in
 the United Kingdom it is 0.33. This has been primarily due to the
 inadequate development of the banking sector in the Russian Fed
 eration, despite the existence of more than 1,700 banks. Alfandari
 and Schaffer (1996) found that bad debts are concentrated in fi
 nancially distressed enterprises in most of the Central and Eastern
 European countries. However, in the Russian Federation, bad debts
 have not been confined to financially troubled enterprises. Large
 energy exporters with access to hard currency have often run large
 arrears with their suppliers and the tax authorities. Banks in the
 Russian Federation have been less likely to lend to the manufac
 turing sector than the energy sector, because manufacturing is less
 competitive in the world markets; yet, the energy sector has been
 one of the largest producers of arrears. Denisova (1997) attributed
 this to different credit polices of banks toward the energy and the
 manufacturing sectors.4
 By the end of 1998, total credits by banks amounted to 412
 billion rubles (36 percent of banks assets, or about 20 percent of
 GDP). Compared to credits to the private sector by the banking
 system, total arrears were more than one trillion rubles by the end
 of 1998. Credits to enterprises were 24 percent of the total assets
 of the banking sector. Overdue debt owed to banks by enterprises
 accounted for 13 percent of total credits to enterprises, or 3 per
 cent of total banking sector assets. These ratios demonstrate that
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 bank credit to the industry was small in comparison to other tran
 sition economies such as Poland. So, limited availability of funds
 and the high cost of borrowing from the banking sector forced
 enterprises to find alternative sources for financing.5
 While aggregate arrears problem in the Russian Federation is
 similar to bad debt problems experienced in other countries in tran
 sition, such as Poland and Hungary in 1992, the composition of
 arrears has been different. In Poland and Hungary most of the bad
 debts were to the banks, while in the Russian Federation inter
 enterprise arrears have accounted for more than half of the over
 due debt. This is because firms in most Central and East European
 countries started to apply hard budget constraints on each other
 early-on in transition (Calvo and Kumar 1993). Furthermore, while
 in Poland, the stock of accumulated arrears was a problem, in the
 Russian Federation both the stock and the flow of arrears have
 been large (Fan et al. 1996).6
 In China, where the transition process started in the early 1980s,
 inter-enterprise arrears, in particular, appeared in the early stages
 of transition. While state-owned enterprises were facing soft-bud
 get constraints, private and collectively owned enterprises were
 applying hard budget constraints. During the eleven years of Chi
 nese reform (1985?1996), the duration of the overdue credit was
 about two months on average, which is comparable to developed
 economies. Early attempts to clear overdue trade credits resulted
 in no change in the stock of arrears (Gao and Schaffer 1998). En
 terprises increasingly moved to using bank loans instead of trade
 credits. In China, as well as in the Central and East European coun
 tries, weak bankruptcy laws were not a factor in the development
 of arrears. Firms established hard budget constraints on each other
 without the bankruptcy laws.
 Apart from common factors that emerge during transition, such
 as illiquidity, the rate of restructuring, inadequate contract enforce
 ment, and bankruptcy laws, the Russian Federation differs from
 other transition economies in terms of its inability to develop a
 banking system as an alternative to trade credit, and its lack of
 voluntary enforcement of hard budget constraints. The use of tax
 arrears and the persistence of the growth of arrears for an extended
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 period are also unique to the Russian Federation.7 Unlike the mon
 etary overhang, which was eliminated by removal of price con
 trols, arrears can only disappear as a result of institutional change,
 including the introduction of new financial instruments that pro
 vide liquidity and contract enforcement. Given the widespread
 implications of arrears, elimination of nonpayment of liabilities
 requires institutional change, rather than quick policy, and will
 require a long time.
 In the next section, we briefly outline the development of ar
 rears in the Russian Federation. The third section discusses in de
 tail the development of nonpayment taxes as a way of financing in
 the past five years. The fourth section reviews the implications of
 arrears as a financing instrument. In the last section, we conclude
 with a discussion of the implications of arrears and provide some
 recommendations for the elimination of arrears.
 The Development of Arrears
 in the Russian Federation
 Before the beginning of transition (i.e., until 1992), monetary-over
 hang was a major problem of the command economy in the Rus
 sian Federation.8 Monetary overhang was eliminated by price
 liberalization in 1992, which resulted with a three-fold price in
 crease in the same year. However, nonpayment of liabilities have
 begun to be a major impediment to growth. Overdue non-pay
 ments or arrears grew from insignificant levels to 50 percent of
 GDP between 1993 and 1998. During the 1993-1998 period, tax
 arrears grew the fastest, at a monthly rate of 4.5 percent, while the
 second fastest growing arrears were wage arrears growing at a
 monthly rate of 3.6 percent (see Table 1). The provisions of the
 value-added tax (VAT) in the current tax code also have rewarded
 both sellers and purchasers for their nonpayment of current liabili
 ties. The seller is not liable for the VAT collected if the payment is
 not received in cash, while the purchaser credits the VAT paid on
 the purchase even though he/she did not make any cash payment.
 In addition, the 1993?1998 period was marked by a decline in the
 use of formal institutions for finance and contract enforcement.
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 Table 1
 Tax, Inter-Enterprise and Wage Arrears, December 1993-December
 1998
 Type of Average real Stock of Share of
 arrears_growth rate (%)_arrears*_GDP
 Monthly Annual (Current prices)
 AXf/AX;_1 42Xf/AX;_12 Rubles, billions (%)
 Tax 4.5 44.0 267.7 9.9
 Enterprise 2.6 26.1 970.0 39.1
 Wage 3.6 32.1 72.6 2.7
 Total 2.9 28.6 1,310.3 48.7
 *Enterprise arrears as of the end of 1998, included arrears owed to other enter
 prises (815 billion rubles), arrears to pension funds (120 billion rubles), and
 overdue long-term debt to banks and other credit institutions (34 billion rubles).
 The explosive growth of arrears since 1993 has been character
 ized as follows (see Figures 1?3):
 The increase in arrears has coincided with the tight monetary
 policies of the CBR and the elimination of soft budget con
 straints. The CBR started its tight monetary policy in 1995 to
 reduce the high inflation rate that had prevailed in the Rus
 sian Federation since 1992. Before the start of tight money
 policy, growth in arrears was not a significant problem be
 cause debtors were using inflation financing. The CBR gradu
 ally removed some of the soft constraints on large enterprises,
 in terms of direct credits. That is, the availability of cheap
 credit to large enterprises was largely reduced, if not totally
 eliminated, thereby limiting the net domestic assets of the
 CBR.9 Thus, the direct link between monetary policy and en
 terprise finance was broken. Before the implementation of
 tight monetary policy, large state enterprises were financed
 directly by the CBR. At the end of the fiscal year, all the out
 standing debts of enterprises were paid by the CBR. In fact,
 in during the high inflation years of 1992 to 1995, the central
 banks of former Soviet countries issued credit to each other's
 enterprises. As a result of the CBR's tight monetary policy,
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 Figure 1. Stock of Overdue Receivables to Consolidated Budget,
 Overdue Receivables to Enterprises and Wage Arrears (September
 1993-January 1999, billions of current rubles)
 consolidated budgets suffered large deficits when enterprises
 started falling behind in the payment of their tax liabilities.
 As a share of GDP, tax collections started to decline. Further
 more, this points to the lack of policy coordination between
 the CBR and the Ministry of Finance.
 Inadequate development of formal institutions for contract
 enforcement (i.e., special courts, law, and enforcement), which
 are essential for free market-based growth, have contributed
 to the accumulation of arrears. Private creditors, including
 the banks, have not been able to resolve their claims on bor
 rowers through the court system. Bankruptcy proceedings have
 been very slow and, in the cases where bankruptcy rulings
 were obtained, liquidation of assets has not been possible.
 Also, the government has not exercised enough rigor in col
 lecting its due tax revenues.
 While large enterprises, as well as the government, have ben
 efited in the short run, the accumulation of arrears has amounted
 to increased tax evasion, has slowed financial development, and
 has resulted in the contraction of credit markets. By either delay
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 Figure 2. Stock of Overdue Receivables to Consolidated Budget,
 Overdue Receivables to Enterprises and Wage Arrears (September
 1993-January 1999, billions of 1995 rubles)
 ing or not paying short-term liabilities such as trade credit or
 wages, enterprises and governments have engaged in off-the
 books financing. For example, trade credit is not shown in the
 balance sheets of enterprises. On the other hand, governments,
 both federal and regional, can keep their budget deficits within
 targets by not paying their short-term liabilities. Also, contract
 enforcement has become ineffective, diminishing the credibility
 of the government as a third-party enforcer.
 By the end of 1998, tax arrears were 25 percent of total stock of
 arrears, while arrears to credit institutions were 13 percent and
 wage arrears were about 8 percent. The remainder were arrears of
 enterprises owed to each other.
 The different accumulation rates of the three types of arrears
 imply that they have resulted from different behaviors by enter
 prises, the government, and the workers. Inter-enterprise arrears
 are primarily accumulated through nonpayment of short-term li
 abilities to suppliers, which amounts to unpaid trade credit. This
 results in a less-than-efficient equilibrium in the product markets.
 Wage arrears are manifested as a form of wage flexibility, thereby
 avoiding layoffs expected under any restructuring.10 However, it
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 Figure 3. Stock of Overdue Receivables to Consolidated Budget,
 Overdue Receivables to Enterprises and Wage Arrears (September
 1994^January 1999, billions of 1995 rubles)
 is difficult to understand the motivation of governments in not
 enforcing the collection of taxes in arrears, while experiencing
 growing budget deficits. A possible explanation for this has been
 the unwillingness of government to trigger unemployment in the
 event of bankruptcy resulting from its claiming tax payments, the
 existence of government expenditure arrears, and an unwilling
 ness to go after large enterprises. In addition, the ministries of
 defense and transportation have carried arrears with defense con
 tractors, the fuel industry, and the utilities. Most local governments
 also have arrears to the utilities and fuel industries. Therefore, with
 government arrears outstanding, it has been more difficult to en
 force tax payments.
 Accumulation of the stock of arrears in the Russian Federation
 requires a reassessment of the government's fiscal and monetary
 policies, because no self-correcting mechanism appears to exist
 that could control or abate the explosive growth in this phenom
 enon. This does not mean that government has not attempted to
 remedy the arrears problems. Indeed, on many occasions the gov
 ernment has issued many decrees or recommendations, or has spon
 sored laws that have been aimed at rectifying the arrears problems.
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 Among these, the frequency of presidential decrees intended to
 solve or mitigate the arrears problems stands out.
 A selected number of policy changes have included:
 1. A tax amnesty in 1993
 2. A government decree on the elimination the of govern
 ment expenditures to enterprises in the first half of 1994, by
 means of a program of mutual offsets of overdue obligations
 in 1993 and in the first quarter of 1994
 3. The 1994 mutual instruction of the CBR, the Ministry of
 Finance (MinFin), and the former State Tax Service11 to
 withdraw the arrears on taxes and the other obligatory pay
 ments from the foreign currency accounts of enterprises
 4. MinFin's issuance of treasury bills KO (Kaznacheiskie
 Obyazatel'stva), as method of payment between enterprises
 and the federal budget, starting in August 1994
 5. The 1994 decrees on mutual settlements of arrears be
 tween enterprises
 6. Allowing MinFin to make mutual settlements between the
 federal budget and enterprises, including payments of KOs.
 Similarly, additional decrees were issued during 1996 and 1997.
 Among these were:
 1. 1996 decrees on rescheduling enterprise debt to the federal
 government and local budgets over 7.5 years, on the condition
 that all future taxes are paid on time
 2. A 1996 decree writing off all the debts owed by the agri
 cultural sector to the federal budget, and setting lower elec
 tricity fees
 3. A 1996 decree paying all debts to the defense industry
 4. A 1997 plan for restructuring arrears via debt for shares,
 thus expanding the government's ownership of enterprises
 that owed taxes to the federal government
 5. A 1997 decree paying all government wage arrears
 6. A 1997 decree guaranteeing foreign credits to enterprises
 that did not have debts to the federal and local budgets and
 pension funds.
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 Overall, despite the fact that the intention behind all of these
 decrees and other acts was to alleviate the arrears problem, the
 stock of arrears continued its unyielding upward trend. In fact, the
 current level of arrears is the cumulative result of all previous
 measures employed by the government.
 Most of these measures, particularly the ones in 1996 and 1997,
 were taken upon the International Monetary Fund's insistence on
 the elimination of tax arrears. However, the measures were short
 lived. After a short period of slow growth in arrears at the end of
 1994 as a result of government measures, the accumulation of ar
 rears resumed. This was because the settlement of arrears was a
 one-time measure, while the basic structure of the financial rela
 tionships remained the same.
 In particular, arrears started to accumulate very fast after the
 implementation of tight monetary policies by the CBR in 1995.
 Declining inflation reduced the ability of debtors to pay their obli
 gations using inflation financing. Furthermore, financial repres
 sion between 1993 and 1997, as documented in Claassen and
 Granville (1997), reduced the ability of enterprises to finance their
 current expenditures by restricting the amount of credits available
 for borrowing within the banking system. This exacerbated the
 liquidity shortage in the economy and forced enterprises, as well
 as the government, to look into financing methods other than in
 flation financing.12
 In the five years between December 1993 and December 1998,
 the total stock of arrears?as measured by overdue receivables to
 government at both the federal and regional levels, overdue re
 ceivables to enterprises, and overdue liabilities to individuals (the
 so called wage arrears)?increased by more than fifty-two times,
 as the stock of arrears increased from 22.09 billion to 1,161 bil
 lion rubles (see Figure 1). In 1995 prices, this amounted to more
 than a four-fold increase (426.05 / 105.44) for the same period.
 The average monthly rate of growth in the real stock of arrears for
 the period from December 1993 to January 1999 was about three
 percent per month (see Table 1). Similar patterns of growth have
 been observed among the subcomponents of the total stock of ar
 rears. Hence, arrears are more than an inflation-induced occur
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 rence. The fact that the aggregate stock of arrears is not stationary,
 and that the process is growing at a very rapid pace, requires a
 close review both at aggregate level and its sub-components (i.e.,
 overdue payments to government, enterprise, and individuals).13
 Historical increases in the total nominal and real stock of over
 due payments for the 1993?98 period are shown in Figures 1?3.
 Figure 1 shows that the nominal stock of overdue payments (i.e.,
 arrears) had an overall upward trend during 1993?98. Figure 2
 shows a more interesting dynamic for the real counterpart of the
 stock of arrears.14 Both figures show that the real stock of arrears
 is somewhat smoother than the nominal stock of arrears. Smooth
 ness of the real stocks of arrears, when compared with substantial
 fluctuations in the inflation rate during the 1993?98 period, sug
 gests that the real economic activities may have internalized the
 arrears phenomenon as another factor in everyday transactions.
 Figure 1 shows that the growth rate in the real stock of arrears,
 after a series of sharp declines in the beginning of 1994, has tended
 to be stable, above zero but below 10 percent towards the end of
 1994 and thereafter. Figure 1 also shows that a December decline
 and a January increase in the growth rate of stock of arrears has
 occurred on regular basis, although this was not highly pronounced
 during December 1997?January 1997 (but see December 1997?
 January 1998). When compared to the evolving levels of arrears
 (see Figure 2), the growth rate in arrears has been stationary (see
 Figure 3).
 Tax, Enterprise, and Wage Arrears
 Decomposing the total arrears into its components provides a bet
 ter understanding of the contribution of each type of arrears to the
 aggregate. Enterprise arrears had reached 36 percent of GDP by
 the end of 1998, while tax arrears were 10 percent and wage ar
 rears 2.7 percent of GDP. Comparison of the aggregate measure of
 arrears (see Figure 1) and its sub-components shows that the sub
 components do not possess similar degree of smoothness in their
 positively evolving trends. However, Pearson correlation coeffi
 cients for these subcomponents are generally 0.98 or higher.
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 The real growth rates in the overdue receivables to government,
 enterprises, and individuals reveal that, similar to their levels, they
 are highly correlated as well (see Table 2). The reported Pearson
 correlation coefficients are generally higher than 0.5, and are highly
 significant for both monthly and annual measures of the growth
 rates. Among other things, high correlation among the levels of
 the overdue receivables to government, enterprises, and individu
 als (i.e., 0.98 or higher correlation coefficient), and the highly sig
 nificant correlation among the growth rates of these variables,
 imply underlying common (i.e., long-run) trends that are worth
 exploring further. While it is often argued that some of the stock
 of arrears is being erased by inflation, thereby minimizing the ef
 fect of arrears on the economy, the growth in arrears in real terms
 still remains significant.
 Overall, while subcomponents of arrears have trended upward,
 their growth rates have been stationary. Growth rates of arrears
 have constant mean and variance, implying that policy changes
 will have a permanent impact, where the impact of policy may be
 predicted.
 Tax Arrears
 Total tax arrears and deferred tax payments had reached more than
 275 billion rubles by the end of 1998, or about 11 percent of GDP.
 This was a fivefold increase over three years. Including interest
 and penalties, tax arrears and deferred tax payments totaled more
 than 470 billion rubles by June 1998. The partial amnesty in June
 1998 eliminated the accrued interest on all tax arrears. Further
 more, the share of tax arrears to the federal government had reached
 more than 60 percent by the end of 1998, after averaging about 55
 percent in 1996 and 1997, while the regional share declined to less
 than 40 percent. This was primarily due to an increase in the fed
 eral share of enterprise profits tax arrears, despite better profit
 ability after the middle of 1997, as well as a small increase in the
 federal share of VAT arrears.
 Overdue tax liabilities consists of liability in arrears?that is,
 overdue tax liability and deferred tax payments, by mutual agree
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 Table 2
 Correlation of Growth Rates in Arrears, December 1993-December
 1998
 and A,2X,/AX)_12 Tax Enterprise Wage
 Tax 1 0.51* 0.66*
 Enterprise 0.81 1 0.57*
 Wage 0.78 0.64 1
 Values in the top half of the above table are Pearson correlation coefficients for
 AY^ / AX(l = (X-Xt X) I Xt X\ values in the lower half of the table are Pearson
 correlation coefficients for \^Xt I A3f _12 = (X-Xt_n) IXt_n
 Significant at the one percent level.
 ment between the Ministry of Taxation and Fees, and local gov
 ernments and the taxpayers. While both federal and regional over
 due tax liability grew at about the same pace from the beginning
 of 1996 until the middle of 1997, arrears to the federal govern
 ment started to accumulate faster. This may have been partly due
 to the change in the composition of arrears by type of tax, and to
 differences in the payment practices of federal and regional gov
 ernments. While the federal government increasingly required cash
 payments for tax liability, regional governments continued the
 practice of non-cash payments for tax liability. It is particularly
 striking to notice the widening of the gap between federal and
 regional tax arrears after the official termination of the MinFin's
 offset (i.e., the mutual elimination of liabilities) program in Feb
 ruary 1998 (see Figures 4 and 5).
 Between 1995 and 1998, real GDP declined at an average an
 nual rate of about two percent, while the inflation rate was de
 clining. Therefore, the increase in tax arrears has not followed
 the general macroeconomic indicators. While the share of fed
 eral and regional tax arrears has remained stable at about 55 per
 cent and 45 percent, respectively, through the end of 1997, the
 share of tax arrears owed to the federal government was more
 than 60 percent by the end of 1998. Furthermore, tax arrears owed
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 Figure 4. Total Tax Arrears to the Consolidated Budget Tax Liability,
 Interest, and Penalty
 500000
 Feb April June Aug Oct Dec Feb April June Aug Oct Dec Feb April June Aug Oct Dec
 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
 to the consolidated and federal budgets have been increasing con
 stantly. Although there was a decline in the share of tax arrears at
 the beginning of 1998, the share of tax arrears as part of total ar
 rears has been increasing again. Tax arrears owed to the consoli
 dated and federal budgets are about 25 percent and 15 percent of
 total arrears, respectively, up from 15 percent and 10 percent since
 arrears started to accumulate. Although deferred tax payments con
 stitute a small portion of the overdue tax liabilities, the share of
 tax deferments by regional governments has been increasing.
 Tax Arrears by Type of Tax
 Decomposing the tax arrears to the consolidated budget indicates
 that the share of VAT had reached 53 percent of tax arrears owed
 to the consolidated budget by the end of 1998, up from 45 percent
 at the end of 1996. The VAT share of total arrears owed to the
 consolidated budget was 43 percent at the beginning 1997. The
 enterprise profits tax and natural resources tax each accounted for
 about 14 percent of arrears owed to the consolidated budget. A
 similar distribution existed for deferred taxes, as well. The increase
 in VAT indicates a worsening of cash flow problem in the economy.
 While VAT is collected by the taxpayers, it is not submitted to the
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 Figure 5. Tax Arrears
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 tax authorities. This amounts to government providing involun
 tary credit to enterprises. Since the federal share of the VAT is 75
 percent, the federal budget is more adversely affected by increas
 ing VAT arrears (see Figure 6).
 The federal share of tax arrears, by type of tax, has been very
 stable over the past two years, with the share of VAT increasing
 gradually. Also, since most excise taxes are collected at the fed
 eral level, about 75 percent of excise tax arrears are owed to the
 federal government. Oil, gas, and alcohol products constitute the
 base of excise taxes. It is surprising that these industries, with their
 lesser cash-flow problems, can carry tax arrears.
 The value added tax (VAT) increasingly accounts for a large
 share of tax arrears. The share of VAT arrears increased from 61
 percent of total tax arrears, to 74 percent of total tax arrears, in
 1997. Since VAT is the primary source of tax revenue for the fed
 eral government, increasing VAT arrears means a larger budget
 deficit with stable budget expenditures.
 In addition, uncertainty about payments by the government pro
 duces significant discounts on any future expected payments. Dis
 counts on non-standard payment instruments may be larger than
 the discounts on standard instruments such as treasury bills (GKOs).
 When the size of the arrears is large enough, due to deep discount
 ing, it will indirectly increase the interest rates.
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 Distribution of Tax Arrears by Type of Industry
 Manufacturing and fuels industries have accounted for more than
 60 percent of total tax arrears to the consolidated budget, followed
 by construction and transportation with arrears shares of about 10
 percent each. Within the manufacturing and fuels industries, fuels
 and.machine building industries account for about 60 percent of
 all tax arrears to the consolidated budget. The fuels industry's tax
 arrears are about 30 percent to 32 percent while machine-building
 industry's tax arrears are about 28 percent to 30 percent. Since
 these two industries are also the largest suppliers of goods and
 services to budgetary organizations, it can be concluded that a
 portion of the tax arrears owed by these industries can be attrib
 uted to expenditure arrears owed by the federal and regional gov
 ernments to these industries.
 The regional distribution of tax arrears reveals that the arrears
 are concentrated in several regions with diversified tax bases. The
 industries in these regions are primarily manufacturing, oil, and
 minerals. These regions are primarily the City of Moscow and the
 Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg, Samara, Bashkiria, Sverdlovsk and
 Kemerovo regions. The Moscow region accounts for about 14
 percent of all tax arrears in the Russian Federation.15 It is also
 worth noting that federal tax arrears are significantly more in these
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 Figure 7. Tax Arrears and Deferred Payments to Consolidated Budget
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 regions, relative to arrears owed to regional governments (see
 Figure 7).
 Arrears as a Financial Instrument
 It is commonly accepted that the primary reason behind the accu
 mulation of arrears is the shortage of liquidity and credit that ex
 ists in the economy. In transition economies, arrears of all forms
 appear after the monetary authorities start to conduct tight mon
 etary policies in their efforts to bring down inflation. Arrears also
 develop as restructuring starts to take place, particularly with the
 removal of direct state-sponsored credits to enterprises. In Denisova
 (1999), the cushioning effect of inter-enterprise arrears in response
 to the tight monetary policy was shown. Transfer of credit func
 tions by the CBR to a weak banking system resulted in illiquidity
 in the financial system and increased the cost of borrowing. While
 the CBR made progress in developing financial instruments to
 improve liquidity, this was done in a trial-and-error manner.16 In
 ter-enterprise arrears are not perfect substitutes for bank credit,
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 and dampen the impact of the transmission of monetary policy
 through credit channels. However, only with more access to bank
 credit is the payment of arrears facilitated.
 The effect of arrears is to reduce the cost of capital in an envi
 ronment where the cost of financing capital is high, because of a
 credit shortage and uncertainty due to weaknesses of financial and
 regulatory institutions, as well as economic risks. Arrears also pro
 vide low-cost financing for enterprises with economic clout and
 governments, the two most significant agents in the economy.
 Financing of capital determines the capital structure of a firm.
 Accordingly, three forms of financing are available for enter
 prises. These are retained earnings, equity, and debt. In general,
 deducibility of interest expenses from taxable income lowers
 the cost of capital and creates a bias in favor of debt financing.
 Calvo and Coricelli (1993) identified trade credit as the fourth
 source of financing.
 In the Russian economy, creation of arrears has provided added
 incentives for debt financing, since the bankruptcy costs are al
 most non existent and enforcement of tax laws is not adequate.
 Furthermore, lack of contract enforcement has created an envi
 ronment where arrears become a cheap alternative to debt financ
 ing. Thus, creating arrears has amounted to implicitly lowering
 the required rate of return for a given level of debt equity ratio for
 those enterprises with the ability to keep payments in arrears. Since,
 the cost of equity increases with the debt/equity ratio, sharehold
 ers require a higher rate of return for exposure to higher risks due
 to higher leverage. Therefore, accumulating arrears with uncer
 tain terms is a good alternative to borrowing from the banking
 system at high interest rates, with a known maturity or issue of
 equity. This practice amounts to implicitly hiding the true cost of
 capital to the enterprise. Thus, the need for restructuring and pro
 ductivity gains disappears. However, nonpayments, while provid
 ing cheap credit to the debtors, increase the cost of capital to the
 creditors. In most cases it is the ultimate creditor?individuals and
 the government?who cannot pass on the cost of nonpayments to
 others. In addition, bankruptcy costs are negligible, thus creating
 further inducement for nonpayment.
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 Equity finance requires well-functioning financial markets with
 standard reporting and auditing practices for transparent corpo
 rate governance. Transaction costs of equity finance can be very
 high for economies without efficient financial markets. This is an
 evolutionary process, and equity finance remains as an expensive
 financing method in Russia, as well as in many other emerging
 markets. Use of retained earnings is not an issue at the moment in
 the Russian economy, since they are almost nonexistent. There
 fore, accumulation of arrears in the form of unpaid trade credits,
 unpaid wages, and taxes serves as a convenient method of financ
 ing, thus implicitly lowering the cost of equity. Furthermore, the
 share of tax arrears in total arrears has been increasing, a trend
 that amounts to lowering of effective tax rates in the economy.
 Different types of arrears may occur as a result of different
 motivations. For example, in the Russian Federation loss-making
 firms do not account for all the inter-enterprise arrears. Large ver
 tically profitable enterprises also carry balances of arrears. Con
 sequently, inter-enterprise arrears account for more than half of
 total arrears in the Russian Federation. The firms' expectations
 about the behavior of other firms, and the monetary authority, is a
 determining factor in the scale of arrears. When adjustment costs
 and the likelihood of a general bailout are high, tight credit will
 induce firms to resist imposing hard budget constraints on their
 customers, and to extend trade credit to high-risk buyers. This
 behavior is significantly different from the practice of trade credit
 in market economies. Although trade credit is viewed tradition
 ally as a mean for sellers to finance buyer purchases at a lower
 cost than banks, or as an alternative payment term to increase prod
 uct demand, it also serves as a contract to obtain information about
 buyer default risk (Smith 1987). Ferris (1981) also argued that
 trade credit reduces precautionary balances.
 The likelihood of a bailout increases the value of the trade credit
 and further credit expansion. As pointed out by Perotti (1998), an
 indiscriminate aggregate credit policy across all enterprises pro
 vides an incentive for collusive behavior.17 Credibility of the cen
 tral bank is the most important institutional factor in avoiding
 opportunistic lending by enterprises that otherwise would adjust
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 to tight credit policy. A difference exists between bank-financed
 and nor>-bank-financed enterprises. Bank financed enterprises have
 less need to restructure when faced with tight credit, because these
 enterprises have a small number of nonpaying customers. To rem
 edy the arrears problem, sufficient collateral is needed. Further
 more, tight credit policies must be reviewed to avoid expectation
 formation about a future bailout.
 Wage arrears have different characteristics, although financially
 distressed enterprises with trade credit arrears are also likely to
 have wage arrears. However, workers' acceptance of delayed com
 pensation is the result of a lack of alternative job opportunities. It
 is very likely that employees feel that they will be faced with a
 similar situation at another enterprise. Furthermore, nonwage ben
 efits can be higher than the cash compensation to employees.
 Nonpayment of wages for extended periods is also tolerated by
 those seeking secondary jobs.
 Tax arrears, the second-largest component of aggregate arrears,
 provide added incentive for resistance to restructuring. First, in
 ter-enterprise arrears result in tax savings to the issuer of trade
 credit, as well as the buyer. Second, accumulation of tax arrears
 and the response of the tax authorities signals the resolve of the
 government. Tight credit policy, pursued on one hand, is rendered
 ineffective by the accumulation of tax arrears. The motivation of
 the government in allowing tax arrears is not clear. It is possible
 that the tax authorities do not consider sufficient collateral in en
 terprises with tax arrears.
 Conclusions and Policy Options for
 Eliminating Arrears
 Accumulation of arrears amounts to interest-free or below-market
 interest rate loans from the creditors, suppliers, government, and
 employees. Furthermore, arrears postpone the completion of re
 structuring and allow for the continuation of unprofitable busi
 nesses. Finally, it creates a business and a legal environment with
 significant financial uncertainties. While arrears may lower the
 cost of financing for some, they increase the cost of borrowing in
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 the aggregate economy. In anticipation of non-payments, suppli
 ers demand higher prices, which amounts to an added risk pre
 mium for nonpayments.
 Factors that contribute to the accumulation of arrears may be
 short-term or long-term. Short-term factors are, namely: liquidity
 shortage, high costs of borrowing, and financial repression of the
 banking system. The CBR's efforts to control monetary policy must
 be coordinated with the government's fiscal policies. Long-term
 factors include lack of institutional development and problems with
 legal enforcement. Hence, institutional reform should be compre
 hensive, rather than on a piecemeal.
 In addition to creating cash-flow problems, accumulation of
 arrears is an indicator of the success of the transition process of
 the Russian economy. Inadequate restructuring in certain indus
 tries in the Russian Federation has manifested itself in less-than
 transparent transactions, of which arrears are the most significant.
 Arrears started to accumulate as a result of tight credit policy. In
 response to the tight credit policy, enterprises allowed trade credit
 expansion to dampen the effects of credit shortage, while inflation
 was significantly reduced. However, arrears delayed the adjust
 ment of enterprises to market conditions, coupled with a concur
 rent policy of allowing tax arrears to accumulate. The practice of
 soft budget constraints continued in a different form, which lim
 ited the development of a new financial system. In addition, tax
 evasion increased as expectations of a bailout formed, starting in
 late 1997.
 Elimination of arrears must start with the government. First,
 government arrears to contractors and to government employees
 must be reduced with a short-term payment program. Currently,
 the amount of government expenditure arrears is unknown. The
 CBR, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, must develop
 financial instruments to facilitate liquidity and short-term pay
 ments. Simultaneously with expenditure arrears, tax arrears must
 be eliminated by restructuring tax debt, either by mutual agree
 ment or by securitization. One also should reconsider the tight
 monetary policies during the transition, and their role in the devel
 opment of arrears. As demonstrated in Denisova (1999), access to
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 bank credit in sectors where arrears are high would reduce the
 arrears and decrease the inflation rate. Long-term remedies for the
 elimination of arrears require building and supporting institutions
 that protect the rights of parties to contracts. Development of third
 party contract enforcement institutions is particularly important.
 Restructuring the banking system and improvement of banking
 supervision is another significant factor in overcoming the prob
 lem of arrears.
 Notes
 1. Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) argued that the arrears problem in Russia
 does not pose a problem, since it is only normal to substitute trade credit for bank
 credit during transition. However, the duration of the outstanding credit and the
 likelihood of repayment are the main problem. This is demonstrated in a survey
 of the 500 largest enterprises reported in the interdepartmental balance commis
 sion (1997), which found the average duration of overdue liabilities to be more
 than one year.
 2. Blanchard (1997) provided an excellent review of preliminary steps in
 transition.
 3. These are common factors in most countries in the early stages of transi
 tion; however, lack of institutional development is particularly prolonged in the
 Russian Federation.
 4. Denisova (1997) showed that energy sector credits are governed by real
 interest rates, while credit is rationed for the manufacturing sector.
 5. That is, high real interest rates for the energy sector and rationed credit for
 manufacturing.
 6. An interesting finding in Fan et al. (1996) is that, although half of the
 enterprises in the Russian Federation are shareholders in a bank, this has no
 impact on credit allocation. Most banks in the Russian Federation exist in name
 only.
 7. Among the Central and East European countries, only Romania has an
 arrears problem similar to that of the Russian Federation (Rostowski 1993).
 8. Monetary-overhang is characterized as a large stock of savings, but fewer
 goods available for consumption, with strict price controls.
 9. SeeAslundetal.(1996).
 10. Layard and Richter (1995) explained wage flexibility as the willingness
 of workers to accept pay cuts in order to preserve jobs.
 11. Now, it is the Ministry of Taxes and Fees (MinTax).
 12. According to the interdepartmental balance report (1997), nonpayments
 with a term of more than six months is practiced by more than 50 percent of the
 large enterprises in the Russian economy. This signals a serious cash-flow short
 age in the economy. Enterprises use nonpayment methods to finance working
 capital and short-term investments.
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 13. Test for stationarity is not reported here.
 14. Given that the stock of arrears is made up of different vintages, we com
 puted the real stock of arrears by deflating changes in stock of arrears, say, ?Xt =
 X ?Xt_l9 over the appropriate price deflator Pt and then summed ?Xt I Pt to get
 tHe real stock of arrears jc = Z= XT A\", I Pr
 15. Regional distribution df tax arrears can be provided upon request.
 16. Balino (1998) described the development of monetary policy by the CBR.
 17. Perotti (1998) demonstrated the effect of initial conditions on enterprise
 adjustment and the development of arrears under a tight credit policy. The cen
 tral bank's aversion to output loss and high restructuring costs has encouraged
 enterprises to issue trade credit to bad-risk firms.
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